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The Golden Line
Syed Iqbal Zaheer |
# 332, 1st floor, Daarus ss
alaahm Bldg., Queen Road, Bangalore -
560052. INDIA. Tel: 2289305 |
ymd@bgl.vsnl.net.in
THE quick debacle of the
Taleban in Afghanistan has taken many by surprise. The best predictions failed.
Why? For a simple reason: at the start it was perceived as a war between
Afghanistan and USA. But the war turned out to be both against an external enemy
as well as an internal one. It was not at all a Jihad between Muslims and
infidels, but rather, with an ugly dimension of an internal struggle for
dominance added to it. And, whenever there is an internal power struggle between
Muslim groups, the applicable Divine laws are different from those applicable
when the struggle is between Islam and un-Islam. Allah
does not enforce His
Religion on a people unwilling. Especially, the unexpected division of the
Pashtun into a smaller religious group and a larger secular body, had its
devastating effects.
Also, there was a vast difference between
now and then, when the Soviets invaded the country. Then there was one enemy,
many friends at the international level, massive monetary help, friendly borders
on two sides and logistical support. This time the Taleban had several enemies
(Jews, Christians, polytheists, atheists, and a vast number of hypocrites at
every level, local and international). They had no monetary help, were trapped
within unfriendly borders, and commanded no logistical support. They only had
the heart-felt Prayers of the Muslim masses from Makkah to Philippine to USA to
Morocco. Rarely have the masses shown such unity.
Further, most people did not
realise at the start the tactics USA would employ. They thought, including many
of the Taleban, that the Americans will send in their ground forces, resulting
in field clashes. They had forgotten the Iraq experience. The Americans well
took the advice of the Russians and stayed in the air most of the time in B-52
bomber air-conditioned cockpits. If they pitched their camps, it was in plain
lands near the Pakistani borders, far away from Afghan mountains. Whenever they
ventured in, they remained at the rear, the Northern Alliance hired soldiers
being at the front. The first fodder fed, they withdrew from the rear.
The high altitude bombing
message was precise and unmistakable. Leave the government or we will kill the
civilians. Bisard and Guillaume Dasquie state in "Bin Laden: The
Forbidden Truth" that the Americans had warned an Afghan delegation in
Washington - much before the twin tower destruction - that either they spread
carpets welcoming American oil and gas exploration teams, or "we will bury
you under a carpet of bombs."
Independent Western
journalists in Afghanistan, Iranian and Pakistani news media, and Internet sites
gave us some glimpse of what was going on. Having wiped out heavy war equipment,
down to anything of jeep size, and confident of a victorious walk in (how they
would have loved to flash pictures of brave Americans liberating Afghanistan all
by themselves?!), whenever the Americans sent in their ground forces, they were
routed. But the Taleban could not see their people pulverised from the air, and
therefore quit, city after city. The Northern Alliance victories were no more
than a cakewalk.
The Taleban experience brought
to clear light a few sobering realities. Such realities that many scholars have
time and again warned of, and have advised the Islamic activists to recognise
them, acknowledge them and take them into account before going into action. It
is about the Ummah. It wishes for Islamic system of life. But what Islam
is it? It is not the Islam of the Khilafah al-Rashidah. It is not the
Islam of sacrifices. It is the liberal Islam, an Islam that looks away when
faced with evils within its borders. It is an Islam that learns to live with
un-Islam. They coexist within the same body politic. It is a liberal Islam,
which the secularist leadership refers to as the moderate Islam. It is a
"take it easy" Islam, the soft Islam, the "not too serious"
Islam. It should be the Islam of the mosques, of Dhikr, of devotions, of
admonition, Hajj and 'Umrah. But not an Islam that submits itself to the
will of Allah
, wholly, unreservedly, in all matters, big and small. As for the
Islam of the Khilafah al-Rashidah times, that's the ideal. But it is for
others. That is, every Muslim community agrees to its enforcement - but on
others, not on them. For them, it is the comfortable kind. The Taleban went
entirely against the public wishes about the "kind of Islam" that was
to be enforced. But, not only that, what after the purest kind of Islam was
enforced on Afghanistan? What were the Taleban's other accomplishments? Where
were the rivers of milk and honey that the preachers promise in the mosques that
will sprout forth if Islam is enforced? Just the opposite: There was grinding
poverty, closure of schools, scarcity of jobs, migration to avoid hunger, and an
uncertain future. What the Taleban gave was intangible: peace, law and order,
dignity to the nation through an example set before the eyes after a millennium
and a half. But what they took away was tangible: banks, jobs, music, wine,
gambling, television. Their ministers could go around the houses in the evenings
and collect leftovers for their dinner. But, the good example was for
themselves. The masses were not impressed. Examples sound good when the
repercussions do not come on you.
Closing down the TV station for example,
was an unforgivable crime. Today's Muslims, all over the world, are absolutely
sure about what they want of this life. Islam comes next. Anyone who
experimented will discover that not the masses, but the so-called committed
Muslims, are at heart opposed to austere Islam, not because it is unpopular
among the masses (a reason they give), but because it is against the Islam of
their understanding. And the Islam of their understanding is West influenced,
West oriented. What kind of reactionary Islam it is that cannot widen the roads
and raise building heights?
This is a reality that the Taleban should
have known before they began to implement a purist Islam. And, if they hadn't
known earlier, they should have learnt when they heard criticism from Muslims
all over the world when they closed down mixed schools, banned women from
working with men (although they paid them their salaries), and closed down the
TV station. And, if they hadn't learnt anything even after the criticism that
came from "committed Muslims", they should have learnt when some
Muslim "scholars" denounced them for destroying the Bamiyan statues.
Surely, they should have known that the Islam of total and unconditional
submission is not on the shopping list of the modern Muslims, however vociferous
they might be about assigning Islam an active role in modern life. Those good
"stories of the past", are, once again, for storytelling, preaching
and admonition. For living, it is a much modified Islam: one without its steam,
if one might say.
The Taleban did something else
that won them disapproval of powerful men in powerful places. They axed at a
business that involves hundreds of thousands of people: from cultivation to the
final delivery in major cities of the West: opium. They thought they were
pleasing the governments. In public, yes. But in private, no? In their
simplicity they did not realise that stage politics is one thing and kickback
politics another. In USA alone it is a multibillion-dollar industry and men in
police, secret services, law-enforcement authorities, and several others in high
and low places have huge stakes in it. The Taleban had religious reasons for
banning the cultivation, but was there anyone in the West truly pleased about
it? We are not saying they shouldn't have done it. We are saying, let us not be
naïve with our enemies.
But not only the Taleban,
Muslims all over evinced the same simplistic attitudes when they withheld their
material support during the six-year rule of the Taleban. They were aware that
the world aid agencies were deliberately sending in women, clad in typical
Western dress, to distribute food among the starving Afghan. They were aware
that the stand-off over Bamiyan statues was because a cultural organisation had
gone there with a couple of millions to renovate the statues while the Taleban
were insisting that dying children needed the money more. So, what were the
Muslim aid agencies doing? When the Taleban closed down mixed schools, they
applied for help to open segregated institutions for girls. World bodies
refused. What about Muslim charity organisations? In fact, much of the Arab mass
sympathy was only won when the Taleban took a principled stand over Mujhaideen
of Arab origin. While the Afghans were going through one of the most serious
drought period of the time, the Da`wah workers were discussing about the
nature of their Islam: was it Ikhwani Islam, Salafi Islam, Deobandi Islam, or
some other? - blind to their immediate needs. Another issue: apart from the
strategic mountainous terrain, what was holding the Taleban from settling their
dispute with the Northern Alliance? Money. A couple of millions would have been
enough to buy off those wild tribes led by thugs. But, was there a donor?
Indeed, just about everyone, including the champions of Islam, was one with the
rest of the world over a complete blockage of aid in order to pull down the
Taleban government. Indeed, even if the Americans hadn't attacked them, one
wonders how long the Taleban would have lasted. Indeed again, if the Americans
hadn't attacked them, how long would their friends down south have tolerated
them and not goaded them on to action?
So, all said, what is the
moral we learn from the Taleban episode? The answer is, if you are not ready to
die, you do not have the right to live an honourable life. The Taleban rule was
one bright patch on the face of a dark contemporary history. It was a truly
Islamic government that gave the hopes to the Islamists that the Ummah is
still capable of feats considered impossible.
Did the Taleban
fail? This is another question that reveals simplistic minds. Militarily: do
wars end in victory in three months time? Indeed, did a war start at all?
Politically: When was a government of their sort established last? And how long
did it last? Why should we first raise our expectations to mountainous heights
and then despair when the Ummah can't climb that high on one foot? In a
way, the Taleban were a grand success. They lasted six to seven years under the
most trying conditions. On average, what government lasts more than five? The
Prophet has said in a Hadiith of Ahmad, "Nubuwwah will remain
among you for as long as Allah
wills. He will take it back when He wills. It
will be followed by Khilafah on the pattern of Nubuwwah until
Allah
wills that it should remain. Then He will take it away. Then it will be an
iron hand monarchy and remain as long as He wills. He will take it back when He
wills. Then it will be a ruthless monarchy. That will be followed by Khilafah
on the pattern of Nubuwwah." Now, the question is, is it conceived
that the promised Khilafah on the pattern of Nubuwwah will be
established in one go, in one try? Wasn't the Taleban experiment one successful
step in the right direction?
The Taleban came on principles
and left defending a principle. How many governments come and go on principles?
Let us unfold our fingers as we count? Ah, we can't unfold a finger. Twice, from
two directions, east and west, came the choice between billions and principles.
"These are our brothers," they replied, "how can we hand them
over without evidence against them?" These are words that history will
write in gold - if it is not written - as usual - by skilled yarn spinners. If
someone rummaged through records of historical statements, he will have to
travel back 250 years to find a sentence of equal noble stature. The words of
another Muslim, Tipu Sultan of Mysore, who said while fighting the British:
"A single day of a tiger's life is better than a hundred years of a
jackal's."
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