The Rift in the UN Security Council
The "disagreements" within the US Security Council pertaining
to Iraq are casually presented by the media as a mere diplomatic rift.
In fact we are dealing with something far more complex. The
Bush Administration's war plans have nothing to do with "Saddam's weapons of
mass destruction" or his alleged links to Osama bin Laden.
The proposed invasion of Iraq is intended to exclude rival
European, Russian and Chinese interests from the Middle-East and Central Asian
oil fields. While in the Balkans, the US "shared the spoils" with Germany and
France, in the context of military operations under NATO and UN auspices, the
invasion of Iraq is intended to establish US hegemony, while weakening
Franco-German and Russian influence in the region.
The clash between Great Powers ("Old Europe" versus and
the Anglo-American military axis) broadly pertains to:
1 Defense and the military-industrial complex,
2. Control over Oil and Gas Reserves,
3. Money and currency systems: clash between the Euro and
the Dollar.
1. Defense and the military-Industrial complex
Beneath the gilded surface of international diplomacy,
fundamental changes in the structure of military alliance have occurred. Since
1999, France and Germany have established military cooperation agreements with
Russia.
NATO is divided. While Britain and the US have joined hands
through the so-called "Atlantic Bridge" in defense production, coupled with
close cooperation in military and intelligence operations, significant
divisions have developed between the US and several of its "European
partners". The Anglo-American axis in weapons production is clashing with its
powerful Franco-German rival, the European Aerospace and Defence Corporation
(EADS). The Western defense industry is split down the middle with British
Aerospace systems now firmly aligned with the big five US weapons producers
against the competing Franco-German conglomerate EADS.
2. Control over Oil and Gas Reserves
The broader Middle East-Central Asian region encompasses
more than 70% of the World's reserves of oil and natural gas. According to
U.S. Central Command: "The purpose of U.S. engagement... is to protect U.S.
vital interest in the region - uninterrupted, secure U.S./Allied access to
Gulf oil." In other words, this is a war of conquest, which also targets rival
oil conglomerates including those of Russia and France which have sizeable oil
interests in Iraq and Iran.
In turn, the Anglo-American oil giants (BP-Amoco, Chevron-Texaco,
Exxon-Mobil, Shell) – supported by the Anglo-American military axis are
clashing with Europe's oil giant Total-Fina-Elf and Italy's ENI, which have
sizeable interests in Iraq, Iran, and Central Asia. Washington has in recent
years attempted to break France's deal with Teheran on the grounds that it
openly contravened the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. What this suggests is that
Europe's largest oil conglomerate dominated by French, Belgian and Italian oil
interests – in association with their Iranian and Russian partners – are
potentially on a collision course with the dominant Anglo-American oil
consortia, which in turn are backed by the Anglo-American military axis:
"Iraq currently possesses 11% of the world's oil and ranks
only second to Saudi Arabia in the size of its reserves (112 billion
barrels). Exploitation costs are less than half those of deep sea drilling.
Direct access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean ensures strategically
secure oil supply routes. The Anglo-american oil giants (BP, Chevron-Texaco,
Shell, Exxon) are all absent from Iran and Iraq, which have signed oil
contracts and production sharing agreements with French, Russian and Chinese
oil companies. Because of the UN sanctions on Iraq, the agreements signed by
Baghdad are not ("officially") operational." (Eric Waddell, The Battle for
Oil, Global Outlook, Issue. No. 3, Winter 2003).
According to the Washington Post (15 September 2002): "A
U.S.-led ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could open a bonanza for
American oil companies long banished from Iraq, scuttling oil deals between
Baghdad and Russia, France and other countries, and reshuffling world
petroleum markets… A proposed $40 billion Iraqi-Russian economic agreement
also reportedly includes opportunities for Russian companies to explore for
oil in Iraq's western desert. The French company Total Fina Elf has
negotiated for rights to develop the huge Majnoon field, near the Iranian
border, which may contain up to 30 billion barrels of oil."
The war is not only being carried out with a view to taking over Iraq's
oil reserves, it is intended to cancel the contracts of rival Russian and
European oil companies as well as exclude France, Russia and China from the
region.
3. Money and currency systems: clash between the Euro and the Dollar.
What is at stake is the rivalry between two
competing global currencies: the Euro and the U.S. dollar, The process of
European monetary integration has encroached upon the hegemony of the US dollar.
The process of dollarisation, which is ultimately an
instrument of economic conquest is undermined by the Euro.
Wall Street is clashing with competing Franco-German
financial interests. The war in Iraq pertains not only to control over reserves
of petroleum, the control over money creation and credit is an integral part of
the process of economic conquest. .
The Anglo-American Military Axis
The 1999 war in Yugoslavia contributed to
reinforcing strategic, military and intelligence ties between Washington and
London. After the war in Yugoslavia, U.S. Defence Secretary William Cohen and
his British counterpart, Geoff Hoon, signed a "Declaration of Principles for
Defence Equipment and Industrial Cooperation" so as to "improve cooperation in
procuring arms and protecting technology secrets" while at the same time "easing
the way for more joint military ventures and possible defence industry mergers."
25
Washington’s objective was to encourage the formation of a
"trans-Atlantic bridge across which DoD [U.S. Department of Defence] can take
its globalisation policy to Europe. …Our aim is to improve interoperability and
war fighting effectiveness via closer industrial linkages between U.S. and
allied companies." 26
In the words of President Clinton’s Defence Secretary William
Cohen:
[The agreement] will facilitate interaction between our
[British and American] respective industries so that we can have a harmonized
approach to sharing technology, working cooperatively in partnership
arrangements and, potentially, mergers as well.27
The agreement was signed in 1999 shortly after the creation
of British Aerospace Systems (BAES) resulting from the merger of British
Aerospace (BAe) with GEC Marconi. British Aerospace Systems was already firmly
allied to America’s largest defence contractors Lockheed Martin and Boeing.
28
The hidden agenda behind the Anglo-American "trans-Atlantic
bridge" is to eventually displace the Franco-German military conglomerates and
ensure the dominance of the U.S. military industrial complex (in alliance with
Britain’s major defence contractors).
Moreover, this integration in the area of defence production
has also been matched by increased cooperation between the CIA and Britain’s MI5
in the sphere of intelligence and covert operations, not to mention the joint
operations of British and U.S. Special Forces.
The United States and Germany
The British military-industrial complex has
become increasingly integrated into that of the U.S. In turn, significant rifts
had emerged between Washington and Berlin. Franco-German integration in
aerospace and defence production is ultimately directed against U.S. dominance
in the weapons market. The latter hinges upon the partnership between America’s
Big Five and Britain’s defence industry under the trans-Atlantic bridge
agreement.
Since the early ‘90s, the Bonn government had encouraged the
consolidation of Germany’s military industrial complex dominated by Daimler,
Siemens, Krupp. Several important mergers in Germany’s defence industry took
place in response to the mega-mergers between America’s aerospace and weapons
producers.29
Already in 1996, Paris and Bonn had set up a joint armaments
agency with the mandate "to manage common programs [and] award contracts on
behalf of both governments." 30 Both countries had stated that they
"did not want Britain to join the agency."
In turn, France and Germany now control Airbus industries
which is competing against America’s Lockheed-Martin. (Britain’s BAES owns the
remaining 20 per cent). The Germans are also collaborating in the Ariane Space
satellite-launching program in which Deutsche Aerospace (DASA) is a major
shareholder.
In late 1999, in response to the ‘alliance’ of British
Aerospace with Lockheed Martin, France’s Aerospace-Matra merged with Daimler’s
DASA forming the largest European defence conglomerate. And the following year,
the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Co. (EADS) was formed integrating DASA,
Matra and Spain’s Construcciones Aeronauticas, SA. EADS and its Anglo-American
rivals are competing for the procurement of weapons to NATO’s new Eastern
European members. (Europe’s third largest defence contractor is Thomson, which
in recent years has several projects with U.S. weapons producer Raytheon.)
While EADS still cooperates with Britain’s BAES in missile
production, and has business ties with the U.S. "Big Five", including Northrop
Grumman, the Western defence and aerospace industry tends to be split into two
distinct groups: EADS dominated by France and Germany on the one hand, the
Anglo-US "Big Six", which includes the U.S. Big Five contractors (Lockheed
Martin, Raytheon, General Dynamics, Boeing and Northrop Grumman), plus Britain’s
powerful BAES.
Integrated into U.S. Department of Defence procurement under
the Atlantic bridge arrangement, BAES was in 2001, the Pentagon’s fifth largest
defence contractor. Under the Anglo-American "transatlantic bridge", BAES
operates freely in the U.S. market through its subsidiary BAE Systems North
America.31
Franco-German Integration in Nuclear
Weapons
The Franco-German alliance in military
production under EADS opens the door for the integration of Germany (which does
not officially possess nuclear weapons) into France’s nuclear weapons program.
In this regard, EADS already produces a wide range of ballistic missiles,
including the M51 nuclear-tipped ballistic submarine-launched ICBMs for the
French Navy.32
Euro versus Dollar: Rivalry Between
Competing Financial Conglomerates
The European common currency system has a
direct bearing on strategic and political divisions. London’s decision not to
adopt the common European currency is consistent with the integration of British
financial and banking interests with those of Wall Street, not to mention the
Anglo-American alliance in the oil industry (as in BP-Amoco) and weapons
production ("Big Five" plus BAES). In other words, this shaky relationship
between the British pound and the US dollar is an integral part of the new
Anglo-American axis.
What is at stake is the rivalry between two competing global
currencies: the Euro and the U.S. dollar, with Britain’s pound being torn
between the European and the U.S.-dominated currency systems. In other words,
two rival financial and monetary systems are competing worldwide for the control
over money creation and credit. The geopolitical and strategic implications are
far-reaching because they are also marked by splits in the Western defence
industry and the oil business.
In both Europe and America, monetary policy, although
formally under State jurisdiction, is largely controlled by the private banking
sector. The European Central Bank based in Frankfurt — although officially under
the jurisdiction of the European Union — is, in practice, overseen by a handful
of private European banks including Germany’s largest banks and business
conglomerates.
The U.S. Federal Reserve Board is formally under State
supervision — marked by a close relationship to the U.S. Treasury. Distinct from
the European Central Bank, the 12 Federal Reserve banks (of which the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York is the most important) are controlled by their
shareholders, which are private banking institutions. In other words, "the Fed"
as it is known in the U.S., which is responsible for monetary policy and hence
money creation for the nation, is actually controlled by private interests on
Wall Street.
Currency Systems and ‘Economic Conquest’
In Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union the
Balkans extending into Central Asia, the dollar and the Euro are competing with
one another. Ultimately, control over national currency systems is the basis
upon which countries are colonized. While the U.S. dollar prevails throughout
the Western Hemisphere, the Euro and the U.S. dollar are clashing in the former
Soviet Union, Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.
In the Balkans and the Baltic States, central banks largely
operate as colonial style "currency boards" invariably using the Euro as a proxy
currency. What this means is: German and European financial interests are in
control of money creation and credit. That is, the pegging of the national
currency to the Euro — rather than to the U.S. dollar — means that both the
currency and the monetary system will be in the hands of German-EU banking
interests.
More generally, the Euro dominates in Germany’s hinterland:
Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and the Balkans, whereas the U.S. dollar tends
to prevail in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In GUUAM countries (which have
military cooperation agreements with Washington) the dollar tends (with the
exception of the Ukraine) to overshadow the Euro.
The ‘Dollarisation’ of national currencies is an integral
part of America’s Silk Road Strategy (SRS). The latter consists in first
destabilizing and then replacing national currencies with the American greenback
over an area extending from the Mediterranean to China’s Western border. The
underlying objective is to extend the dominion of the Federal Reserve System —
namely, Wall Street — over a vast territory.
What we are dealing with is an ‘imperial’ scramble for
control over national currencies. Control over money creation and credit is an
integral part of the process of economic conquest, which is in turn supported by
the militarisation of Eurasian corridor.
While American and German-EU banking interests are clashing
over the control of national economies and currency systems, they seem to have
also agreed on "sharing the spoils" — i.e. establishing their respective
"spheres of influence." Reminiscent of the policies of ‘partition’ in the late
19th Century, the U.S. and Germany have agreed upon the division of the Balkans:
Germany has gained control over national currencies in Croatia, Bosnia and
Kosovo where the Euro is legal tender. In return, the U.S. has established a
permanent military presence in the region (i.e. the Bondsteel military base in
Kosovo).
Cross-cutting Military Alliances
The rift between Anglo-American and
Franco-German weapons producers — including the rifts within the Western
military alliance — seem to have favoured increased military cooperation between
Russia on the one hand, and France and Germany on the other.
In recent years, both France and Germany had entered into
bilateral discussions with Russia in the areas of defence production, aerospace
research and military cooperation. In late 1998, Paris and Moscow agreed to
undertake joint infantry exercises and bilateral military consultations. In
turn, Moscow has been seeking German and French partners to participate in the
development of its military industrial complex.
In early 2000, Germany’s Defence Minister Rudolph Sharping
visited Moscow for bilateral consultations with his Russian counterpart. A
bilateral agreement was signed pertaining to 33 military cooperation projects
including the training of Russian military specialists in Germany. 33
This agreement was reached outside the framework of NATO, and without prior
consultation with Washington.
Russia also signed a "long term military cooperation
agreement" with India in late 1998 which was followed a few months later by a
defence agreement between India and France. The agreement between Delhi and
Paris included the transfer of French military technology, as well as investment
of French multinationals in India’s defence industry. The latter includes
facilities for the production of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads in
which the French companies have an expertise.
This Franco-Indian agreement has a direct bearing on
Indo-Pakistani relations. It also impinges upon U.S. strategic interests in
Central and South Asia. While Washington has been pumping military aid into
Pakistan, India is being supported by France and Russia.
Visibly, France and the U.S. are on opposite sides of the
India-Pakistan conflict.
With Pakistan and India at the brink of war, in the wake of
September 11, the U.S. Air Force had virtually taken control of Pakistan’s air
space, as well as several of its military facilities. Meanwhile, barely a few
weeks into the 2001 bombing of Afghanistan, France and India conducted joint
military exercises in the Arabian Sea. Also in the immediate wake of September
11, India took delivery of large quantities of Russian weapons under the
Indo-Russian military cooperation agreement.
Moscow’s New National Security Doctrine
U.S. post-Cold War era foreign policy has
designated Central Asia and the Caucasus as a "strategic area." Yet this policy
no longer consists of containing the "spread of communism", but rather in
preventing Russia and China from becoming competing capitalist powers . In this
regard, the U.S. has increased its military presence along the entire 40th
parallel, extending from Bosnia and Kosovo to the former Soviet republics of
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, all of which have entered into
bilateral military agreements with Washington.
The 1999 war in Yugoslavia and the subsequent outbreak of war
in Chechnya in September 1999 was a crucial turning point in Russian-American
relations. It also marked a rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing, and the
signing of several military cooperation agreements between Russia and China.
U.S. covert support to the two main Chechen rebel groups
(through Pakistan’s ISI) was known to the Russian government and military. (For
further details, see Chapter II.) However, it had previously never been made
public or raised at the diplomatic level. In November 1999, the Russian Defence
Minister, Igor Sergueyev, formally accused Washington of supporting the Chechen
rebels. Following a meeting held behind closed doors with Russia’s military high
command, Sergueyev declared that:
The national interests of the United States require that
the military conflict in the Caucasus [Chechnya] be a fire, provoked as a
result of outside forces", while adding that "the West’s policy constitutes a
challenge launched to Russia with the ultimate aim of weakening her
international position and of excluding her from geo-strategic areas.34
In the wake of the 1999 Chechen war, a new "National Security
Doctrine" was formulated and signed into law by Acting President Vladimir Putin,
in early 2000. Barely acknowledged by the international media, a critical shift
in East-West relations had occurred. The document reasserted the building of a
strong Russian State, the concurrent growth of the Military, as well as the
reintroduction of State controls over foreign capital.
The document carefully spelled out what it described as "
fundamental threats" to Russia’s national security and sovereignty. More
specifically, it referred to "the strengthening of military-political blocs and
alliances" [namely GUUAM], as well as to "NATO’s eastward expansion" while
underscoring "the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major
military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders." 35
The document confirms that "international terrorism is waging
an open campaign to destabilize Russia." While not referring explicitly to CIA
covert activities in support of armed terrorist groups, such as the Chechen
rebels, it nonetheless calls for appropriate "actions to avert and intercept
intelligence and subversive activities by foreign states against the Russian
Federation." 36
Undeclared War Between Russia and America
The cornerstone of U.S. foreign
policy has been to encourage — under the disguise of "peace-keeping" and
so-called "conflict resolution" — the formation of small pro-U.S. States which
lie strategically at the hub of the Caspian Sea basin, which contains vast oil
and gas reserves:
The U.S. must play an increasingly active role in conflict
resolution in the region. The boundaries of the Soviet republics were
intentionally drawn to prevent secession by the various national communities
of the former USsR and not with an eye towards possible independence. …
Neither Europe, nor our allies in East Asia, can defend our [U.S.] mutual
interests in these regions. If we [the U.S.], fail to take the lead in heading
off the kinds of conflicts and crises that are already looming there, that
will eventually exacerbate our relations with Europe and possibly Northeast
Asia. And it will encourage the worst kind of political developments in
Russia. This linkage, or interconnectedness, gives the Transcaucasus and
Central Asia a strategic importance to the United States and its allies that
we overlook at huge Risk . To put it another way, the fruits accruing from
ending the Cold War are far from fully harvested. To ignore the Transcaucasus
and Central Asia could mean that a large part of that harvest will never be
gathered.37
Russia’s Military Industrial Complex
Alongside the articulation of Moscow’s
National Security doctrine, the Russian State was planning to regain economic
and financial control over key areas of Russia’s military industrial complex.
For instance, the formation of "a single corporation of designers and
manufacturers of all anti-aircraft complexes" was envisaged in cooperation with
Russia’s defence contractors.38
This proposed ‘re-centralization’ of Russia’s defence
industry in response to national security considerations, was also motivated by
the merger of major Western competitors in the areas of military procurement.
The development of new production and scientific capabilities was also
contemplated, based on enhancing Russia’s military potential as well as its
ability to compete with its Western rivals in the global weapons market.
The National Security Doctrine also "eases the criteria by
which Russia could use nuclear weapons … which would be permissible if the
country’s existence were threatened." 39
Russia reserves the right to use all forces and means at
its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case an armed aggression creates a
threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent
sovereign state. 40
In response to Washington’s "Star Wars" initiative, Moscow
had developed "Russia’s Missile and Nuclear Shield". The Russian government
announced in 1998, the development of a new generation of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, known as Topol-M (Ss-27). These new single-warhead missiles
(based in the Saratov region) are currently in "full combat readiness", against
a "pre-emptive first strike" from the U.S., which, (in the wake of September
11), constitutes the Pentagon’s main assumption in an eventual nuclear war. "The
Topol M is lightweight and mobile, designed to be fired from a vehicle. Its
mobility means it is better protected than a silo-based missile from a
pre-emptive first strike."41
Following the adoption of the National Security Document (NSD),
in 2000, the Kremlin confirmed that it would not exclude "a first-strike use" of
nuclear warheads "if attacked even by purely conventional means." 42
Political ‘Turnaround’ under President
Vladimir Putin
Since the very outset of his term in office,
President Vladimir Putin — following in the footsteps of his predecessor Boris
Yeltsin in the Kremlin — has contributed to reversing the National Security
Doctrine. Its implementation at a policy level has also been stalled.
At the moment, the foreign policy directions of the Putin
Administration are confused and unclear. There are significant divisions within
both the political establishment and the Military. On the diplomatic front, the
new President has sought [to establish] a ‘rapprochement’ with Washington and
the Western Military Alliance in the so-called "war on terrorism." Yet, it would
be premature to conclude that Putin’s diplomatic openings imply a permanent
reversal of Russia’s 2000 National Security Doctrine.
In the wake of September 11, a significant turnaround in
Russian foreign policy, largely orchestrated by President Putin, has nonetheless
occurred. The Putin Administration, acting against the Russian Duma, has
accepted the process of "NATO Enlargement" into the Baltic states (Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia) implying the establishment of NATO military bases on
Russia’s Western border. Meanwhile, Moscow’s military cooperation agreement
signed with Beijing after the 1999 war in Yugoslavia is virtually on hold:
China is obviously watching with deep concern Russia
surrendering these positions. China is also concerned by the presence of the
U.S. Air Force close to its borders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrghyz
Republic. … Everything that Mr. Putin has earned through the spectacular
improvement of Russia’s relations with China, India, Vietnam, Cuba and some
other countries, collapsed nearly overnight. What has surfaced is a primitive
Gorbachev concept of ‘common human values’ — i.e. the subordination of
Russia’s interests to those of the West.43
Ironically, the Russian President was supporting America’s
"war on terrorism", which is ultimately directed against Moscow. Washington’s
hidden agenda is to dismantle Russia’s strategic and economic interests in the
Eurasian corridor, close down or take over its military facilities, while
transforming the former Soviet republics (and eventually the Russian Federation)
into American protectorates:
It becomes clear that the intention to join NATO expressed by
Mr. Putin in an offhand manner last year [2000], reflected a long matured idea
of a far deeper (i.e. in relation to the positions previously taken by Gorbachev
or Yeltsin) integration of the Russian Federation into the so-called
"international community." In fact, the intention is to squeeze Russia into the
Western economic, political and military system. Even as a junior partner. Even
at the price of sacrificing an independent foreign policy.44
The above text is an excerpt from the later part of Chapter 5
of
War and Globalisation . The numbering of the notes indicated below is
the same as in the original chapter 5 from which the excerpt was taken.
Notes
25. Reuters, 5 February 2000
26. For further details see Vago Muradian, "Pentagon Sees Bridge to Europe",
Defence Daily, Vol. 204, No. 40, Dec. 01, 1999
27. Ibid.
28. Vago Muradian, "Pentagon Sees Bridge to Europe", Defence Daily,
Vol. 204, No. 40, Dec. (See also Michel Collon’s analysis in Poker Menteur,
Editions EPO, Brussels, 1998, p. 156
29. See also Michel Collon’s analysis in Poker Menteur, Editions EPO,
Brussels, 1998, p. 156
30. American Monsters, European Minnows: Defence Companies. The Economist,
13 January 1996
31. British Aerospace Systems’ home page at: http://www.BAESystems.com/globalfootprint/northamerica/northamerica.htm
32. BAES, EADS Hopeful That Bush Will Broaden Transatlantic Cooperation,
Defence Daily International, 29, 2001
33. Interfax, 1 March 2000
34. See The New York Times, 15 November 1999; see also the article of
Steve Levine, The New York Times, 20 November 1999
35. To consult the document see Federation of American Scientists (FAS),
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm
36. Ibid.
37. Joseph Jofi, Pipeline Diplomacy: The Clinton Administration’s Fight
for Baku- Ceyhan, Woodrow Wilson Case Study, No. 1. Princeton University,
1999
38. Mikhail Kozyrev, the White House Calls for the Fire Vedomosti, Nov. 1,
1999, p.1
39. See Andrew Jack, Russia Turns Back Clock, Financial Times, London
, 15 January 2000, p.1
40. Quoted in Nicolai Sokov, Russia’s New National Security Concept: The
Nuclear Angle, Centre for Non Proliferation Studies, Monterrey, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sokov2.htm,
January 2000
41. BBC, Russia Deploys New Nuclear Missiles, London, 27 December 1998.
42. Stephen J. Blank, Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Proliferation in Russian
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers, Federation of American Scientists
(FAS), http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/toc-3.htm. Washington DC,
undated.
43. V. Tetekin, Putin’s Ten Blows, Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG)
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/TET112A.html, 27 December 2001.
44. Ibid.
Copyright Michel Chossudovsky 2003.
